Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that profit-oriented owners delegate pricing decisions to managers through contracts that incentivize them to behave less aggressively. Hoernig (2012) extends their analysis to environments with network effects and f...
This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network ex- ternality parameter, manufacturers’ strategic...
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 26(5) 612-632 2017年7月 [査読有り]
With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a ver- tical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good f...
Considering the interplay between network externalities and the degree of product substitutability in a vertical structure, we compare the outcomes of vertical integration and vertical separation. In contrast to previous results, we show that when...
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