By incorporating port competition into a third-market model consisting of two exporting firms and one importing country, we demonstrate the endogenous choice of port structures (i.e. privatization or public ownership) under either Bertrand or Cour...
BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 68 S56-S65 2016年12月 [査読有り]
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of...
2016 JOINT 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFT COMPUTING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (SCIS) AND 17TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ADVANCED INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (ISIS) 113-117 2016年 [査読有り]
This paper first examines the relation between simultaneous and sequential game in a vertical market structure. I show that the equilibrium in the sequential-move games can be duplicated with the asymmetric simultaneous-move games. Vertical separa...
2014 JOINT 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFT COMPUTING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (SCIS) AND 15TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ADVANCED INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (ISIS) 873-878 2014年 [査読有り]
This paper compares Bertrand model and Cournot model in a vertically related duopoly market with asymmetric costs between downstream firms. We focus on the cost-inferior downstream firm. We show, from the perspective of the upstream firm, that it ...
In this paper we analyze vertical restraints by two manufacturers in which each sells through a separate retailer who has private information on the uncertain demand it faces. The degree of product differentiation plays an important role in equili...
国際学部
経済学部